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In this paper, we assess the demographic and economic consequences of mi-
grations in Europe and neighbourhood countries. In order to do so, we rely
on a multi-region world overlapping generations model (INGENUE2). The
rich modeling framework of this multi-regions model allows us to put into
connection migration with the "triangular" relationship between population
aging, pension reforms and international capital markets. With this model,
we are also able to quantify the demographic and economic consequences of
migration ￿ows on both the regions receiving and losing migrants. Our anal-
ysis is based on a very detailed migration scenario between Western Europe
and the Neighborhood regions constructed by taking into account both the
current situation and some prospective empirical scenarios. Our quantita-
tive results shed some light on the long term consequences of migration on
regions that are not at the same stage in the ageing process. Concerning the
regions receiving migrants, despite some improvement of their public pen-
sion system, it appears that our realistic migration scenario does not o￿set
the e￿ect of ageing in these regions, leaving room for pension reforms. Con-
cerning the regions losing migrants, the adverse economic consequences of
emigration appear to be all the more important than the region is advanced
in the ageing process (and is already su￿ering from a declining population).
J.E.L. classi￿cation number: F21, C68, J61, H55.
Keywords: CGEM, Migration, International capital ￿ows, Neighbourhood
policy
21 Introduction
For the past few years, the pace of international migration has accelerated and
this phenomenon is likely to further develop in the coming decades as a part
of the world globalization process. During the 20th century, Western Europe
has been one of the major host region of migrants with the United-States.
At the end of the last century, about 30 million foreigners are established
there. Migration backgrounds are diverse but net immigration ￿ows con-
tribute signi￿cantly to population growth in Western Europe, in many cases
overtaking natural population increases in recent years. Despite their recent
status as immigration countries, the largest foreign national stocks continue
to be from the traditional labor recruitment countries of Southern Europe
(Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece). Turkey and Mediterranean countries
complete the list of traditional migration ￿ows to Western Europe.
The recent period is characterized by new migrations, especially from East-
ern and Central European regions and Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). Indeed, migration ￿ows between and within these regions have in-
creased after the Soviet Union began to disintegrate. In the early 1990’s, the
annual number of o￿cially recorded net migrants from Central and East-
ern European countries to Western countries was around 850.000, compared
with less than half this in the three preceding decades (Salt (2005)). The
early period of transition was marked by ethnic and con￿ict-driven migra-
tion, while during the later, as the situation stabilized, migration became
mainly economically motivated. In this respect, migration issues and asso-
ciated policies became an important socio-economic issue both in receiving
and in sending countries. As one of the main channels of interdependency
among economies, immigration is a longstanding concern for policy makers
and has been alternately considered as a challenge or an opportunity for
Western Europe.
Since the frontiers of a larger Europe are not well-de￿ned, it might be rel-
evant to assess the consequences of tighter links between Western Europe
and regions perceived to be in its back yard. One such structural change
is already in motion through the opening to larger ￿ows of migrants from
nearby territories. The Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union could
de￿ne more precisely the migration policy between Europe and some speci￿c
countries. Immigration is one of the policy options amongst the policies to
alleviate the ￿nancial burden on the public retirement system and to sus-
tain the growth rate of the working age population. Some political leaders
seem also ready to embrace the idea that an in￿ux of migrants is the best
way to save the European pension systems by limiting the increase of the
3dependency ratio and the contribution rate.
Future trends in migration could have more substantial demographic conse-
quences than what has been observed in the past. As fertility has fallen below
replacement in Europe, policies to encourage immigration may become an
important means for EU to moderate rates of population decline. The Euro-
pean Union policy strategy on migration issues has been presented in several
o￿cial publications (see EuropeanCommission (2006), for instance) 1. This
question appears all the more crucial that numerous CIS countries (which
constitute good candidates as emigration countries) are very advanced in the
ageing process and are already su￿ering from a declining population.
In order to assess the demographic and economic consequences of migrations
in Europe and neighbourhood countries, we use the INGENUE 2 model 2. The
model describes a multi-region, world model in the spirit of those developed
by Obstfeld & Rogo￿ (1996) in which the structure of each regional economy
is similar to that of other applied overlapping generations (OLG) general
equilibrium models (such as Auerbach & Kotliko￿ (1987)). The INGENUE
2 model is presented in detail in a technical working paper (see Ingenue
(2007a)) and several scenarios have been analyzed in detail by the INGENUE
Team. Ingenue (2006) analyzed the consequences of sustained technological
catching up in Eastern Europe as well as some speci￿c migration scenario.
Ingenue (2007b) detailed the global consequences of Asian regions catch up
simultaneously with an improvement of the pensions systems in these regions.
In the model, the world is divided into ten regions according to geographi-
cal and demographic criterions. The GDP growth rate of each region relies
mainly on its demographic evolution and on the assumption regarding the
catching up process of total factor productivity. With this general equi-
librium model, we have useful insights on the impact of the asynchronous
ageing processes on international capital ￿ows as well as the interest rates.
We are also able to describe the demographic and economic consequences of
migrations on both the regions receiving and losing migrants. Discussions
on the macroeconomic e￿ects of immigrations have become a focus of policy
and media attention in Western Europe, following the surge in labor force
from new member states as well as neighbourhood regions. To the best of our
knowledge, very few works deal with this question using a general equilibrium
1The issue related to the building of a common policy on labor immigration of the
European Union is presented in detail by Carrera (2007).
2The INGENUE 2 model was developed at CEPII, CEPREMAP and OFCE by
Michel Aglietta (CEPII), Vladimir Borgy (CEPII), Jean Chateau (OECD), Michel Juil-
lard (CEPREMAP), Jacques Le Cacheux (OFCE), Gilles Le Garrec (OFCE) and Vincent
TouzØ (OFCE).
4applied approach even if it appears to be a very important issue.
The rich modeling framework of this multi-regions model allows us to put
into connection migration with the "triangular" relationship between popu-
lation aging, pension reforms and international capital markets that receives
increasing attention in the academic literature, see Brooks (2003), B￿rsch-
Supan, Ludwig & Winter (2006), Aglietta et al. (2007) and Krueger & Lud-
wig (2007). The purpose of this strand of the literature is to analyze the
accumulation and the international ￿ows of capital that are induced by the
di￿erential ageing process in di￿erent regions of the world.
Most of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on immigration is
based on partial equilibrium models. Computable OLG models with migra-
tion usually consist of "closed" economy models 3. Storesletten (2000) and
Chojnicki, Docquier & Ragot (2005) investigate whether a reform of immi-
gration policies could attenuate the ￿scal burden of ageing in the coming
decades. Iakova (2007) and Barrell, FitzGerald & Riley (2007) consider the
macroeconomic e￿ects of the migration that followed the enlargement of the
EU in May 2004. Only two studies (Fehr, Jokisch & Kotliko￿ (2003, 2004)),
have treated international migration in multi-country open-economy CGE-
OLG models. These papers develop a three countries model (United States,
Europe and Japan) to study the macroeconomic e￿ects of increased immi-
gration on the three countries’ pension systems. Even if they use an open
economy framework, the impact of immigration on the sending countries and
on inter-country inequalities are not treated as the regions losing migrants
are not explicitly modeled.
Compared to these studies, our paper o￿ers a global vision of the conse-
quences of international migrations. Indeed, the value-added of the Ingenue
model is that it is able to analyze the e￿ects of international migrations
on both the destination and the origin regions. Consequently, the follow-
ing questions are addressed: what is the impact of migration on economic
growth, capital accumulation consumption, pension schemes and the current
accounts of sending and receiving countries? Can immigration from neigh-
bourhood regions help mitigate the adverse e￿ects of population ageing in
Western Europe?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our de-
mographic model. The macroeconomic model is presented in section 3. The
main results of the baseline path (without migration) are presented in section
4. The economic study of migrations from neighbourhood countries follows
3With the exception of the modeling of in￿ows of workers, the equilibrium of these
OLG models is similar to the benchmark model of Auerbach & Kotliko￿ (1987).
5in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Demographics
The World is divided into 10 regions according mainly to geographical and
demographic criteria (Figure 1). These regions are labeled : Western Eu-
rope, Eastern Europe, North America, Latin America, Japan, Mediterranean
World, Eastern Asian World, Africa, Slavic World 4. and South Asian World.
The countries included in each region are detailed in Appendix 1. The neigh-
bourhood countries (CIS and Mediterranean countries) are included in 3 re-
gions: the South Asian World (including Kazakhstan and Tajikistan), the
Slavic World (including Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Republic
of Moldova) and the Mediterranean world (including Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, together with Maghreb and
Middle East countries).
4The countries traditionally included in the slavic area are more numerous than the
ones included in this region of the model. The Slavic world of the model corresponds more










































































































































































































































































































































72.1 Population structure and projection method
The period of the model is set to ￿ve years. In each region z, the economy is
populated by 21 overlapping generations who live up to a maximum age of
105. For notation purpose, age is denoted by a ∈ [0,...,20]. For instance,
a = 2 corresponds to the individuals aged 10-14. The number of people of
age a at time t is: denoted by Lz
a(t)5. At date t the number of "births"
(individuals between 0 and 4 years old) is then denoted by Lz
0(t) and total




ages 15 and 50, women give birth to fraction of children at the beginning of
each period (Figure 2). Our agents die at each age and the probability of
death is one at age 105.
Figure 2: The individual life cycle
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Population evolution is calculated according to a standard population pro-
jection method on the basis of historical and prospective UN data. For that
purpose, a simple demographic model has been developed, allowing to gen-
erate projections that are consistent with United-Nations (2001) data. First,
we aggregate the population structure across the countries of each region with
the UN data from 1950 to 1995. Then we project fertility, net migrations
and mortality trends (for both sexes) at the region-aggregate level. This,
together with initial population structures in 1995, allows us to obtain the
evolution of the population at a world level from 2000 until the ending date
5More generally, for any household variable, a subscript a denotes age and an argument
t in parentheses denotes calendar time.
8of the model. With some usual population projection methods, the evolu-
tions of mortality and fertility tables are constructed on the only basis of life
expectancy and global fertility rates evolutions in the future.










where Lfaz(t) is the female population of age a at time t and fz
a is the
average age-speci￿c fertility rate. At each time, we calibrate fz
a for the 10
geographical regions so that the number of births matches the UN ￿gures
until 2050.
People could die before 105 years old ; if sa denotes the conditional probability
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a (t) for all a > 0 (1)
with Mz∗
a (t) the number of net migrants that enter or leave the country. We
thus have Mz∗
a (t) > 0 in case of immigration and Mz∗
a (t) < 0 in case of
emigration.
For population projections, we then need some process to describe the evo-
lution of {sz
a−1(t − 1)}a>0 for t = 2000,...,T (for both sexes). For this, we
￿rst have to set initial and ￿nal mortality tables. The starting tables are
taken from UN data between years 1995 and 2000. The ending table are cho-
sen among UN "typical" long run mortality tables (from Coale & Demeny
(1966)). According to UN methods, we extrapolate future mortality tables
on the basis of an expected trend for life expectancy. We adopt a linear
process of convergence.
In the baseline scenario, we implicitly assume that there is no migration ￿ows
in the future (Mz∗
a (t) = 0) so that the population evolution is only given
by mortality and fertility assumptions. Then, we build a comprehensive
migratory scenario to analyze the demographic and economic consequences
of migration for Europe and the neighbourhood regions. Unlike fertility and
mortality, which are in transition worldwide from high to low levels in a long
historical process, there is much more uncertainty concerning net migration
(see Alho & Borgy (2007)). Therefore, migration projections have no strong
and consistent trend that can serve as the backbone of credible projection
9assumptions for the future, particularly in the case of Eastern Europe and
CIS countries that had recently known crisis migration. For this reason, it
is important to assess migration potential of these regions by analyzing the
main driving forces of the past and recent trends. For that purpose, we use
the migration estimation run by Uzagalieva (2007). Assumptions related to
migratory ￿ows are then developed in details in section 5.
After 2050, the demographic model is calibrated in order for the population to
converge towards a stationary level 6. For that purpose, the number of females
entering the population must be equal to the number of outgoing females, i.e.
to the number of deaths. Indeed, when the number of women is constant, the
number of births is constant and the model converges automatically towards
a stationary population.
2.2 Main demographic features of the baseline scenario
Our baseline scenario reproduces UN projections with no migration through
2050. According to our demographic forecasts, the world population reaches
9.3 billions in 2050 and 10.3 billions in 2100 7. Population of the South Asian
world grows at a sustained pace and reaches 31% of the world population
against 28.3% in 2000 (see Figure 3(a)). Population of the Eastern Asian
world increases at a very low pace between 2030 and its culmination in 2050.
As a consequence, the share of the population of this region decreases during
the ￿rst part of the 21st century (from 27% to 22%). The population of
the African region is growing at the highest pace in our projections given the
high fertility rates that characterize the countries included in this region. The
Mediterranean region is also characterized by a dynamic demography with
a doubling population on the ￿rst half of the century. On the contrary, the
Western European population is relatively stable until 2020 and then clearly
diminishes. This ￿gure is even more pronounced for Eastern Europe and
the Slavic world with a total population that begin to reduce immediately
(respectively -15% and -30% between 2000 and 2050).
A sharp contrast will arise in the rate of growth of the labor force (Figure
3(b)). Without migrations, it will decline throughout the ￿rst half century
in the Slavic world (very fast), Eastern Europe, Western Europe and Japan.
It will decline more moderately in North America (after 2010) and Eastern
Asian world (after 2020). It will decelerate but grow until 2050 in Latin
6This is a technical constraint to satisfy in order to compute the steady state of the
OLG model.
7The historical data (between 1950 and 2000) come from the UN database.
10America, South Asia and the Mediterranean countries. The most atypical
region is Africa where the labor force will hardly decelerate at all. As a
consequence of the dynamism of their working-age population, these regions
will need a lot of capital to equip their numerous workers. As the leading
OECD countries concentrate the largest part of world capital, the growth
regime of the world economy will depend on international capital but also in
a lower extent on labor mobility.
An intergenerational transfer of resources via capital export from the rich age-
ing countries to the labor force growing countries will make the world regions
strongly interdependent. One can see on Figure 3(c) that the proportion of
high savers in total population 8 follows a wave pattern that propagates from
one region of the world to the next through the decades. The ratio culmi-
nates ￿rst in Japan as soon as 1995 and remains at a high level until 2030.
Then, North America experiences its maximum in 2025 and Western Europe
in 2030, Eastern Europe, Slavic and Eastern Asian world after this date. All
are regions with declining labor force and thus hamper growth in the future.
On the contrary, the regions found on Figure 3(b) as the potentially fast-
growing regions see a progressive ageing leading to an increase of the high
savers ratio which does not culminate before 2050. It follows that savings
will ￿ow from early high savers to late high savers in the coming decades.
Finally, this ageing phenomenon is resumed on ￿gure 3(d) that presents the
evolution of the old age dependency ratio (retirees in percentage of total
working age population). While the fact of population ageing is common
to all regions (except Africa), extent and timing di￿er substantially. For
example, this ratio is doubling in the case of Western Europe on the ￿rst
half of the XXIst century and is expected to be almost 100% in 2050 when
it is expected to be only around 43% in the same time in the Mediterranean
world. It should be noted that Eastern Europe and the Slavic World are more
severely a￿ected by ageing. The resulting asynchronous demographic ageing
raises numerous issues for pension schemes concerning notably replacement
migrations. Indeed, developed countries have an incentive to increase legal
immigration since this would alleviate the ￿nancial burden on the public
retirement system by limiting the increase of the dependency ratio and the
contribution rate.
8In this OLG model with life cycle behavior, the high saver populations are the cohorts































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































123 INGENUE 2: A long term model for the
world economy
Our economic simulations were made with the computable, general equi-
librium, multi-regional overlapping-generations model INGENUE 2 9. The
model was initially constructed to assess wealth accumulation and the devel-
opment of pension funds and other forms of retirement saving, in a global
macroeconomic setting, for ten major regions of the world, until 2050 10. Each
of ten regions is made of four categories of economic agents : the households,
the ￿rms, a ￿ctive world producer of a world intermediate good and a Pay
As You Go (PAYG) retirement pension system 11.
3.1 Household behavior
The individual life-cycle of a representative agent is described in Figure 2.
Between ages 0 and 20, our agents are children and are supported by their
parents. Given the speci￿cities of developing countries, we assume that chil-
dren can begin to work at age 10 but their income is included in their parent
income. At age 21, our agents become independent and start working. When
becoming independent, individuals make economic decisions according to the
life cycle hypothesis. A voluntary bequest is left to children at age 80 subject
to survival until 80.
In the budget constraint (see equation 3 in Appendix 2), the expenditures
consist of consumption (including costs of children) and saving in each age
and each period. On the income side there is, ￿rst, the return on accumulated
saving corrected by one-period survival probabilities. Second, there is non-
￿nancial income that depends on age: labor income (after social security
taxes) adjusted by a region-speci￿c age pro￿le of labor force participation
for people in full labor activity; a mix of labor income and pension bene￿ts
for people partially retired (reduced labor activity); full pension bene￿ts for
people entirely retired. The lifetime utility (equation 2) is maximized under
the intertemporal budget constraint, taking prices, social contributions and
9For technical features of the new INGENUE 2 model, as well as the baseline scenario
and a sensitivity analysis of the main structural parameters, see Ingenue (2007a).
10For a synthetic view on the global demographic changes issue, see IMF (2004) and
Ingenue (2002a). This issue is also explored in a multi-country model by B￿rsch-Supan
et al. (2006) and Krueger & Ludwig (2007).
11This presentation of the multi-regions model is completed by a technical appendix.
The equations mentioned in this section are presented in detail in appendix 2.
13bene￿ts as given (Modigliani (1986)). As Fehr, Jokisch & Kotliko￿ (2004),
we do not distinguish between natives and immigrants in the model once the
immigrants have joined the destination country.
3.2 The public sector
The public sector is reduced to a social security department. It is a Pay-
As-You-Go (PAYG) public pension scheme, that is supposed to exist in all
regions of the world. It is ￿nanced by a payroll tax on all labor incomes
and pays pensions to retired households. The regional PAYG systems oper-
ate according to a de￿ned-bene￿t rule. The exogenous parameters are the
retirement age and the replacement ratio. They are region-speci￿c and the
contribution rate is determined so as to balance the budget, period by period
(equation 5).
3.3 The production side and the world capital market
In order to deal with relative price movements of foreign and domestic goods
we assume that the di￿erent countries produce di￿erent, imperfectly sub-
stitutable intermediate goods using labor and capital (equation 6). In the
spirit of Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1995), we assume that the domestic
composite ￿nal good of each region is produced according to a combination
of the domestic intermediate good and an homogenous world good imported
by the region from a world market (equation 9). In order to simplify the
exchanges of intermediate goods between regions of the world, this homoge-
nous world good is "produced" by a ￿ctive world producer as the output of
a combination of all intermediate goods exported by the regions (equation
10).
The depreciation rate is asymmetrically dependent on the ownership ratio,
de￿ned as the ratio of the total wealth of households to the capital stock (see
equation 12). Indeed, ￿rms of indebted countries to the rest of the world
borrow at a higher interest rate than the world interest rate and this "indebt-
edness premium" is proportional to its ￿nancial market exposure (measured
by the ownership ratio). At equilibrium, the marginal return to capital thus
depends on the net external position. In net creditor regions, home assets
marginal return is equal to the real home interest rate plus the capital de-
preciation rate. In net debtor regions, home assets marginal return is equal
to the real home interest rate plus the capital depreciation rate plus the
"indebtedness premium".
143.4 Technological catching up
All production functions are augmented by Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
coe￿cients at constant prices which is a synthetic measure of technological
progress for the whole economy. Estimating TFP is an appallingly di￿cult
task for the ten world regions of the INGENUE 2 model. We de￿ne TFP as
a Hicksian neutral technological progress in a Solow growth model. It means
that there exits a production frontier shifting over time. The level of TFP is
exogenous and grows at a constant rate, in each region. For 1950 until 2000,
the growth rate of TFP is given by historical data. After this date the rate
of growth of the TFP is the result of a given, exogenous growth of 1.1% per
annum in the North American region, supposed to be the technological leader,
and a region-speci￿c exogenous, catching-up factor, re￿ecting international
di￿usion of technological progress.
In the baseline scenario of the model, three regions have a sustained catching
up process: the takeo￿ in the Eastern Asian and South Asian regions which
had already started in the 1990’s is assumed to gain momentum. Eastern
Europe is also assumed to be a fast growing region due to its participation to
the European Union. Figure 4 gathers the pro￿les of TFP in the world regions
of the INGENUE 2 model. Before 2000, the model has been calibrated on the
basis of the international macroeconomic database constructed by Heston,
Summers & Aten (2002).
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154 Baseline path in the case without migration
4.1 Solving the model
The baseline scenario is the outcome of a long and weary process of cali-
bration. To put the model on an acceptable track on the projection phase
starting in 2000, the model computation shall begin at an initial date as far
as in the past as the data permit it. The initialization begins in 1950 where
initial stock of capital, household assets and an age distribution of savings
are estimated. Exogenous variables and parameters are the demographic
pro￿les in each region that are outputs of the upstream demographic model;
the coe￿cients of the TFP determination in intermediary and ￿nal sector of
each region; and the social security policy parameters in each region.
The competitive world equilibrium stems from ￿ve set of equations: intertem-
poral utility maximization of households; intertemporal pro￿t maximization
of ￿rms in intermediate goods sectors; period pro￿t maximization of ￿rms in
￿nal goods sectors; period pro￿t maximization of the world producer; and
market clearing conditions. The markets for intermediate goods, ￿nal goods,
labor in each region, and the market for the world intermediate good, are
cleared in each period. These equations determine all relative equilibrium
prices expressed in a common numeraire, which is the price of the interme-
diate good in North America. This convention allows us to express values
in constant dollars. Finally, Walras’s law implies that the world ￿nancial
market equilibrium is the redundant equation.
4.2 The world economy’s baseline transition path
We now turn to our simulated baseline policy transition paths for the 10
regions. The baseline scenario is not easy to depict since it is a dynamic
rational expectations general equilibrium model. Any order of description is
somewhat arbitrary because it could give the false impression of a recursive
causal system of determination between blocks of relations. Here, we only try
to give the main intuitions necessary to understand how the model work (see
Ingenue (2007a, 2007b) for a complete description of the baseline). Results
of the migration scenario will be presented with more details.
16Regional growth
Growth in the world economy is shaped by secular trends in its most struc-
tural long-run determinants, i.e. the change in the demographic structure in
the di￿erent parts of the world and the di￿usion of technological progress.
As previously detailed, assumptions regarding technological convergence are
conservative in the baseline scenario. Besides, the parameters that de￿ne
public pension systems perpetuate existing policies in the beginning of the
XXIst century. Therefore the pattern of the GDP regional growth rates
largely follows that of the regional labor force growth rates.
Two characteristics stand out (see Figure 5(a)). Firstly, there is a general
slowdown in growth because the working age population growth rate di-
minishes in all regions except Africa after 2000. Secondly, the dispersion
in the growth rates is almost as large in 2050 as in 2000, because ageing
is a lengthy process with countervailing impacts on the labor force of less-
developed countries. Nevertheless convergence in total factor productivity
has an impact since the dispersion in the growth rates of the labor force is
substantially higher in 2050 than in 2000, while the dispersion in the GDP
growth rates is slightly lower.
North America and Europe have growth pro￿les that partly di￿er from the
general pattern. In North America, growth decelerates precipitously in the
￿rst decade after 2000 and stabilized thereafter, following the labor force
and productivity pattern. Europe (West and East) and worse the Slavic
world have a gloomy future. Western Europe follows a similar pro￿le as
North America but at a much lower growth rates. GDP growth decelerates
fast after 2000 until 2030 from 3.2 to 0.7% and stabilizes until 2050. The
slavic world is the region with the lowest growth rate almost throughout the
half-century and ends up in complete stagnation.
Investment and saving
Gross investment rises with net capital accumulation and with replacement,
which is modulated by the change in the rate of depreciation in debtor re-
gions. Therefore in regions with a fast growth of the labor force and high
foreign indebtedness, the rate of gross investment to GDP will increase until
2030.
Net saving in each region is the aggregate of individual savings over the
life cycle. It depends on the demographic structure (high savers ratio and
dependency ratio), on the expectation of future income and on the param-
17eters of PAYG pension systems. Demographic determinants are prevalent.
Regions with the fastest-increasing dependency ratios are the ones with the
fastest-decreasing net saving rates, namely Japan, Western Europe, Eastern
Europe, Slavic world (Figure 5(b)). Meanwhile, this gloomy demographic
factor is compounded with a slow expected progression in income. In the
Eastern Asian, South Asian, South America and the Mediterranean world,
the high saver ratio and the dependency ratio rise in tandem. In the early
decades, while the population is still young, those regions grow faster than
more demographically mature ones. It follows that young people expecting
higher future income indulge in debt, reducing the overall saving rate.
Interest rates and capital ￿ows
According to the model, the world real interest rate declines over the ￿fty
years period. This is due to global ageing. Figures 3(b) and 3(c) show
that the working age population is decelerating or declining while the age
group of high savers is growing in one region after another. As a result,
the world saving-investment balance is tilted more and more towards a lower
interest rate. This downward trend provides the general pro￿le of regional
real interest rates (see Figure 5(c)). The hierarchy of regional real interest
rates is linked to the rate of change of the real exchange rates which regulate
investment and saving ￿ows. The gap between investment and saving is the
current account balance of each region. It is ￿nanced by capital ￿ows whose
amounts are such that yield di￿erentials between di￿erent regions cancel out
in every period.
The world ￿nancial equilibrium allocates capital ￿ows so as to ￿nance current
account imbalances. The magnitude of ￿nancial positions is measured by the
ownership ratio which is the ratio of the aggregate wealth accumulated by
households in the region to the capital stock laid out in the region. Hence
a ratio above one is tantamount to a creditor position against the rest of
the world, a ratio less than one to a debtor position. The ownership ratios
are determined by cumulative current account balances. The most striking
feature is the divergent pro￿le of North America (see ￿gure 5(d)). It is due to
an assumed change in household saving behavior. With this structural change
and with a population consistently younger than in Japan and Europe, the
rise in saving in North America is translated into a double improvement in








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































195 Consequences of migration
We now turn to analyze demographic and economic consequences of migra-
tion from neighbourhood countries into the European Union. For that pur-
pose, an immigration shock is introduced into the model as an increase in the
number of young adults (aged between 21 and 24, i.e. Mz∗
a (t) = 0 if a 6= 4).
After crossing the border, immigrants automatically become natives in an
economic sense, i.e. they have the same preferences and fertility behaviors
as natives and adjust to the productivity of the host region. Furthermore,
as in Storesletten (2000), we assume that immigrants move into receiving
countries without any capital. 12 However, this choice seems to play a minor
part in the results since most immigrants actually enter the country before
the age of 30, i.e. at the beginning of the wealth accumulation process.
5.1 Calibration of migration ￿ows compatible with o￿-
cial ￿gures
Given the regional grouping of the INGENUE2 model, the neighbourhood
regions are including in 3 regions of the model: the Slavic world, the South
Asian World and the Mediterranean World. For the South Asian World, we
only calibrate migration ￿ows for the two CIS countries that are included in
this region: Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. For the Mediterranean World, we
distinguish migration ￿ows from North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia and Western Sahara) and from the CIS Middle East countries
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).
The Slavic World is composed of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus
and Moldova.
Evaluation of current migration ￿ows
International migrants are unevenly distributed across world regions. By
2005, 47% of the stock of international migrants were resident in industrial
countries and 53% in developing countries. Here we only focus on migration
that concerns Europe and CIS regions. Western Europe has experienced
net in￿ows of migration for four decades and represents the second major
immigration area with 21% of the total immigrant stock. Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union had a stock of migrants of around 15% of total
12These assumptions are necessary to avoid problems of agent heterogeneity that would
complicate the computation of the transitory path.
20stock. Migration in these regions follow a broad biaxial pattern: on one axis
a migration system developed among the countries of Western, Central and
Eastern Europe and on the other a system of movement arose among the
CIS countries (World-Bank (2006)). For example, Russia receives 75% of its
immigrants from other CIS countries and over 70% of migrants from Western
ECA (Europe and Central Asia regions) go to Western Europe (World-Bank
(2006)). Finally, North Africa is characterized by a predominant labor mi-
gration toward Europe.
Following these facts, we distinguish 4 types of regions in the model:
• pure immigration zones only face to inward ￿ows: Western Europe;
• pure emigration zones only face to outward ￿ows: Mediterranean World,
South Asian World;
• intermediate zones face simultaneously in- and out￿ows: Eastern Eu-
rope, Slavic World;
• no migration zones are isolated from international mobility of work-
ers (there is thus neither immigration nor emigration): North America,
Latin America, Eastern Asian World, Africa. This assumption is neces-
sary given by the fact that we focus on neighborhood regions’ migration
￿ows.
We then adopt a calibration process that allows to make actual net migra-
tion ￿ows compatible with our multi-regions description of the world using
di￿erent data sources. First, we aggregate net migration ￿ows by countries
used in the medium variant of 2004 UN population projections (United-
Nations (2004)) to correspond to the INGENUE2 regional grouping. Then,
we calibrate immigration ￿ows to Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the
Slavic world on UN ￿gures removing intra-regional ￿ows (for example Ger-
man migrations to France) as well as non-pertinent ￿ows (for instance West-
ern Europe migrations to North America). Given the world aspect of our
model, immigration in host regions has to correspond to emigration in send-
ing regions. Thus, we have to allocate immigration ￿ows to Western Europe,
Eastern Europe and the Slavic world by origin regions. For that purpose,
we ￿rst use the emigration stocks and rates of 195 origin countries built by
Docquier & Marfouk (2005) to allocate the immigration ￿ows to Western
Europe between our pure emigration zones.
However, Docquier & Marfouk (2005)’s database only focus on OECD coun-
tries as receiving countries and there is no information on migration ￿ows to
21Eastern Europe and the Slavic world. Thus, for Eastern Europe, the Slavic
World and the CIS countries, we complete with the recent World Bank re-
port on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (World-Bank (2006))
as well as with the recent data of Salt (2005). Table 1 gives the calibrated
net migration ￿ows by regions in 2005 and Figure 1 gives the direction of
migration ￿ows by region as well as countries concerned by migration. Note
that the calibrated ￿ows appear lower than the UN o￿cial net ￿ows given
that we only focus on Western Europe and neighbourhood regions.
Table 1: Yearly net migration ￿ows by origin and destination countries in
2005 (in thousand)
Western Europe Eastern Europe Slavic World Total Emigration
Mediterranean World 124.6 0.8 53.2 178.6
          - North Africa 112.9 0.5 0.0 113.3
          - CIS Middle East Countries 11.7 0.4 53.2 65.3
South Asian World 9.8 0.2 54.6 64.7
Eastern Europe 74.6 0.0 0.0 74.6
Slavic World 47.1 23.7 18.2 89.0
          - Russian Federation 29.6 5.0 0.0 34.6
          - Ukraine 17.5 18.7 18.2 54.4
Total Immigration 256.1 24.7 126.0 406.9



















Estimation of future migration ￿ows
We have to reproduce this methodology for each ￿ve year period in the
future. Some migration streams are durable lasting decades and relatively
predictable. Conversely, assessing migration potential in CIS countries is a
very complex task requiring a careful consideration of factors, apart from
economic and demographic ones. Indeed, recent study of World-Bank (2006)
suggest that the nature of labor migration in the CIS countries has changed
since the beginning of the reforms. Namely, emigration from these countries
was caused primarily by political and ethnic motives, initially. In recent
years, economic reasons are becoming increasingly important and workers
move mainly for higher incomes, better job opportunities and quality of life.
Moreover, migration ￿ows that are generated in the recent period may be
unsustainable in a decade owing to the medium-term population dynamics
in most of the CIS countries. Consequently, future migrations ￿ows from
CIS countries can not be evaluated by simply extending recent ￿ows. The
main driving forces of the past and recent trends in the migration ￿ows in
CIS thus have to be fully analyzed.
For these reasons, we use the estimations performed by Uzagalieva (2007)
22concerning the possible scenarios of future migration ￿ows in CIS countries
until 2025. Uzagalieva (2007) evaluates the potential migration ￿ows from
CIS to Western Europe and Russia based on economic and demographic
factors but also on other factors of migrants’ life such as ethnic background,
political situation and migration policies in CIS countries. The assessment of
the immigration potential to Russia and Western Europe from CIS countries
also requires a number of assumptions to be made in order to re￿ect future dif-
ferences in economic and political climate, policies and reform progress. More
speci￿cally, among the di￿erent scenarios suggested by Uzagalieva (2007), we
adopt the status-quo scenario in terms of catching-up which is close to our
assumptions on TFP.
In concrete terms, the scenarios of future migration ￿ows in CIS countries
are determined for 3 population groups separately:
1. The ￿rst group includes emigration for ethnic reasons (nationalities
which have ethnic ties with other countries) that will most likely em-
igrate irrespective of socio-economic and political situation in CIS, if
they are attracted by foreign countries. The potential emigration is
obtained at about one million for the period 2006 to 2025.
2. The second group includes new ethnic minorities which appeared after
the establishment of independent CIS states. Their migration potential
to Russia will depend more on socio-economic and political situation in
CIS, as well as the Russian politics. Using a standard gravity model,
the estimated migration potential is 6.7 millions for the period 2006
to 2025. Under the higher degree of economic uncertainty in CIS,
which is measured in terms of the standard deviation of GDP growth
rates across its members, the estimated potential of migration to Rus-
sia would be larger (13.18 millions), while policy restrictions towards
immigration in Russia would reduce the estimated potential to 3.23
millions.
3. The third group concerns emigration potential from CIS to Western
Europe. The assessment of this potential emigration ￿ows is based on
the estimation results reported in Fertig (2001), with the underlying in-
tuition that long-run migration perspectives will be driven by economic
factors. The potential emigration from CIS to Germany and Western
Europe for economic reasons is equal to 1.26 million and 2.18 millions,
respectively, for the period from 2006 to 2025.
Migration ￿ows from CIS countries are thus carefully estimated on economic,
demographic and political factors that distinguish our work from traditional
23projections relying more on informed judgements than on systematic model-
ing.
Net migration from other regions (North Africa and Eastern Europe) after
2005 are relatively steady and predictable. Thus, we simply calibrate our
migration ￿ows to match the UN time pro￿le until 2025. Given the long run
feature of INGENUE 2, we need to make some assumptions on migration
￿ows far in the future. Between 2030 and 2100, we keep emigration rates
constant at their 2025 values so that migrations ￿ows only evolve with the
number of young workers in emigration area. After 2100, migration ￿ows pro-
gressively reduce and are nil in 2150 in order for the population to converge
towards a stationary level. Table 2 gives the dynamics of net migration ￿ows
until 2050. We have to underline here that migration ￿ows extrapolations
beyond 15 years are not reasonable. Thus, long run value should be seen as
a possible extension to provide some hints rather than real prediction.
Table 2: Net migration ￿ows by regions until 2050 (in thousand)
2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 2026-2030 2046-2050
Western Europe 0 256.1 235.1 226.0 204.9 199.9
Mediterranean World 0 -178.6 -147.6 -153.6 -159.3 -175.8
          - North Africa 0 -113.3 -101.8 -101.8 -97.3 -102.0
          - CIS Middle East Countries 0 -65.3 -45.8 -51.8 -62.1 -73.8
South Asian World 0 -64.7 -50.8 -50.3 -51.6 -54.8
Eastern Europe 0 -49.9 -45.4 -45.4 -42.5 -36.8
          - Inflows 0 24.7 24.7 24.7 20.8 18.0
          - Outflows 0 -74.6 -70.1 -70.1 -63.3 -54.8
Slavic World 0 37.0 8.7 23.3 48.6 67.6
          - Inflows 0 107.8 70.7 80.2 93.4 106.0
          - Outflows 0 -70.8 -62.1 -56.9 -44.8 -38.4
Sources: Docquier and Marfouk (2005), Salt (2005), United-Nations (2004), World Bank (2006), Uzagalieva (2007); Authors' calculations ￿
5.2 Results of the migration scenario
The results of our comprehensive migration scenario are compared to the
benchmark with no migration. The e￿ects of the shock on the main demo-
graphic and macroeconomic variables are presented in Figure 6 (expressed in





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26The introduction of migratory ￿ows from neighbourhood countries in our
demographic model strongly modi￿es the international distribution and the
age structure of the world population for the concerned regions. Western
Europe is the only zone that faces large immigration ￿ows (the Slavic world
also exhibits the features of an immigration zone on the whole period but to
a lower extent) while Eastern Europe, South Asian and Mediterranean zones
are emigrations zones (Figure 6(a)). Thus, Western Europe and the Slavic
world have a total population respectively 6.5% and 2.7% higher than in the
baseline case in 2050. At the same time, the population of Eastern Europe
and Mediterranean world is respectively 3.4% and 2.6% lower. The South
Asian world is barely a￿ected by migration from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan
given that these two countries only represent around 1% of the South Asian
world total population in 2005.
International migrations also modify the age structure of the world popula-
tion since migrants are assumed to be young workers (aged 20-24). In 2050,
the dependency ratio is almost 6.7 points lower than in the baseline case in
Western Europe (Figure 6(b)) and 3.4 point lower in Slavic world. At this
horizon, it increases by about 3.9 points in Eastern Europe and by almost 2
points in Mediterranean World13. It follows that the ￿nancing of the PAYG
pension system is substantially improved (resp. deteriorated) in Western
Europe and in Slavic world (resp. in sending regions) in line with the de-
pendency ratio evolution. For example, the contribution rate reaches 30.4%
in Western Europe in 2050 (compared to 32% in the baseline case) because
migrants contribute to its ￿nancing. Therefore, the net rate of immigration
necessary to o￿set the e￿ect of ageing in the long run are very high.
The impact of migratory ￿ows from neighbourhood regions on the GDP
growth rate is far from being insigni￿cant. The arrival of young workers
progressively increases the GDP growth rate in Western Europe. It is more
than 0.2 point higher in 2035 and then stabilizes to this gap with the ageing of
￿rst migrant cohorts (see Figure 6(g)). The e￿ect on the Slavic world GDP
growth rate follows the working age population evolution and is thus less
marked. The mirror e￿ect of the improving economic situation in Western
Europe and in Slavic world is a deterioration in the regions of emigration,
and noticeably in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the magnitude of the deterioration
13Note that the emigration rates in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean world
are relatively similar. The signi￿cant di￿erence on the dependency ratio evolution is
explained by the di￿erent demographic features between these two regions. The former
is much advanced in the ageing process whereas the latter are still characterized by a
more sustained growth of its working age population. The consequences of young workers
emigration are thus more pronounced in the Eastern Europe case.
27depends on the loss of potential workers relative to the total labor force in the
regions. As previously explained, Eastern Europe su￿ers the most adverse
consequences of emigration as it is a region much advanced in the ageing
process and is already su￿ering from a declining population.
Nevertheless, the level of consumption per capita is less than in the baseline
scenario in Western Europe until the very end of the half-century (see Figure
6(h)). The reason lies in the production sector : the in￿ow of workers reduces
capital intensity relative to baseline. Indeed, immigration can be seen as a
supply shock on the labor market, thus impacting on the productivity of
factors supplied by natives. For a given stock of capital, an increase in labor
supply reduces the capital by worker. The marginal productivity of capital
is raised and the interest rate as well. Conversely, labor productivity is
diminished with a lower capital intensity.
The real wage rate, being a decreasing function of the return on capital on
the factor price frontier, is itself on a slower path than in baseline. It follows
that relatively to the baseline scenario consumption is less augmented than
total population ; hence consumption per capita is lower. Around 2035,
when savings gain momentum (see Figure 6(c)) the interest rate recedes
a bit because savings grow faster than investment. Therefore the growth of
consumption per capita relative to baseline turns positive from 2020 onwards
and the level overtakes the baseline one in 2040. In the Slavic world, the level
of consumption per capita is always lower than in the baseline given the net
savings pro￿le.
The opposite occurs in emigration regions. But the impact is di￿used over
several regions and mitigated by the size of the labor force. The fall in
the interest rate and the subsequent increase in productivity persists for
almost the entire span of the ￿fty year period. Only Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean exhibit a non-negligible increase in consumption per capita.
The sharp increase of saving in Western Europe (compared to the baseline
trajectory) from 2030 is mainly explained by the facts that the ￿rst cohorts
of migrants are now entering the "high saver" cohorts (aged between 45
and 69). The opposite occurs mainly in Eastern Europe where saving is
decreasing substantially from 2030, as a new illustration of the fact that
this region su￿ers the most adverse consequences of emigration as it is much
advanced in the ageing process (see Figure 6(c)).
Because of the rise in interest rate, the saving investment balance in Western
Europe stays more in surplus than in the baseline scenario. The current
account balance, which was already in surplus in baseline, is therefore more
so. The real exchange rate is depreciated relative to baseline since the real
28interest rate is higher. Yet it still appreciates slightly during the half-century.
It follows from the improvement of the current account balance that Western
Europe reinforces its creditor position in the world economy. The ownership
ratio rises systematically above baseline (see Figure 6(f)). The regions of
emigration with slightly appreciating exchange rates relative to baseline stay
more in de￿cit and more in debt.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we assess the demographic and economic consequences of migra-
tion in Europe and the neighbourhood countries, using a general equilibrium
overlapping generations model. With such a tool, we are able to quantify
precisely the demographic consequences of the migrations between neigh-
bourhood regions and Western Europe. The general equilibrium OLG model
gives some interesting insights into the macroeconomic adjustments of such
migration scenarios in the long run. In particular, we show that the ￿nanc-
ing of the PAYG pension system is substantially improved in the regions
receiving the migrants (Western Europe and the Slavic world in the migra-
tion scenario presented here). Nevertheless, one must note that this realistic
migration scenario does not o￿set the e￿ect of ageing in the regions receiv-
ing the migrants: in this regard, pension reforms appears to be necessary in
order to deal with the ageing problem that these regions will face in a near
future. Concerning the regions losing migrants, the adverse consequences of
emigration are more important the more the region is advanced in the ageing
process (and is already su￿ering from a declining population). In this re-
gards, our analysis provides some quantitative results than allow to compare
the consequences of emigration for Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean
World, two regions that are not at the same stage in the ageing process.
We have to underline that our results are sensitive to some assumptions of the
model. On the one hand, immigrants are assumed to have exactly the same
productivity as the native workers. The skill distribution of immigrants from
neighbourhood regions suggests that they may be less skilled than the aver-
age European worker. On the other hand, the INGENUE 2 model assumes
perfect ￿exibility in the labor and goods markets. Thus, immigration has no
impact on unemployment and economic output is continuously at potential.
Furthermore, the general equilibrium multi-regions OLG model that we use
have several assumptions that could limit the scope of our analysis. Firstly,
the remittances ￿ows (associated with the migrations ￿ows) are not modeled
29in our framework. Clearly, these ￿ows could be of great importance, from a
quantitative point of view, noticeably when we focus on some speci￿c coun-
tries (in particular in countries of limited size where the emigration rates
are high such as Moldova, Albania, Tajikistan or Armenia with remittances
higher than 10% of GDP). Secondly, the age of migrants is limited to some
speci￿c cohort and we do not model return migration. Such demographic
assumptions would be quite di￿cult to include in our multi-regions OLG
framework. Despite the shortcomings that we mention, it appears that the
main value-added of our analysis is the long term general equilibrium analy-
sis that we propose. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, it’s the ￿rst time
that migration consequences are treated in a such an applied global model
that simultaneously deals with destination ad origin regions issues.
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33Appendix 1: Regional grouping
The World is divided in 10 regions according mainly to geographical criteria
in the following way. Countries or regions concerned by migration ￿ows are
underlined.
1. "Western Europe" : ’Channel Islands’, ’Denmark’, ’Finland’, ’Ice-
land’, ’Ireland’, ’Norway’, ’Sweden’, ’United Kingdom’, ’Greece’, ’Italy’,
’Malta’, ’Portugal’, ’Spain’, ’Austria’, ’Belgium’, ’France’, ’Germany’
(East + West), ’Luxembourg’, ’Netherlands’, ’Switzerland’.
2. "Eastern Europe" : ’Estonia’, ’Latvia’, Lithuania’, ’Bulgaria’, ’Czech
Republic’, ’Hungary’, ’Poland’ ’Romania’, ’Slovakia’, ’Slovenia’, ’Alba-
nia’, ’Bosnia and Herzegovina’, ’Croatia’, ’Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia’.
3. "North America" : ’Canada’, ’United States of America’, ’Aus-
tralia’, ’New Zealand’, ’Melanesia’, ’Fiji’, ’New Caledonia’, ’Papua New
Guinea’, Solomon Islands’, ’Vanuatu’, ’Micronesia’, ’Guam’, ’Polyne-
sia’, ’French Polynesia’, ’Samoa’.
4. "Latin America" : ’Argentina’, ’Bolivia’, ’Brazil’, ’Chile’, ’Colom-
bia’, ’Ecuador’, ’French Guiana’, ’Guyana’, ’Paraguay’, ’Peru’, ’Suri-
name’, ’Uruguay’, ’Venezuela’, ’Belize’, ’Costa Rica’, ’El Salvador’,
’Guatemala’, ’Honduras’, ’Mexico’, ’Nicaragua’, ’Panama’, ’Bahamas’,
’Barbados’, ’Cuba’, ’Dominican Republic’, ’Guadeloupe’, ’Haiti’, ’Ja-
maica’, ’Martinique’, ’Netherlands Antilles’, ’Puerto Rico’, ’Saint Lu-
cia’, ’Trinidad and Tobago’.
5. Japan
6. "Mediterranean World" : ’Algeria’, ’Egypt’, ’Libyan Arab Jamahi-
riya’, ’Morocco’, ’Tunisia’, ’Western Sahara’, ’Armenia’, ’Azerbaijan’,
’Bahrain’, ’Cyprus’, ’Georgia’, ’Iraq’, ’Iran’, ’Israel’, ’Jordan’, ’Kyrgyzs-
tan’, ’Kuwait’, ’Lebanon’, ’Occupied Palestinian Territory’, ’Oman’,
’Qatar’, ’Saudi Arabia’, ’Syrian Arab Republic’, ’Turkey’, ’Turkmenis-
tan’, ’United Arab Emirates’, ’Uzbekistan’, ’Yemen’.
7. "Eastern Asian World" : ’China’, ’Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea’, ’Mongolia’, ’Republic of Korea’, ’Brunei Darussalam’, ’Cam-
bodia’, ’East Timor’, ’Lao People’s Democratic Republic’, ’Myanmar’,
’Philippines’, ’Singapore’, ’Thailand’, ’Viet Nam’.
348. "Africa" : ’Burundi’, ’Comoros’, ’Djibouti’, ’Eritrea’, ’Ethiopia’, ’Kenya’,
’Madagascar’, ’Malawi’, ’Mauritius’, ’Mozambique’, ’RØunion’, ’Rwanda’,
’Somalia’, ’Uganda’, ’Tanzania’, ’Zambia’, ’Zimbabwe’, ’Angola’, ’Cameroon’,
’Central African Republic’, ’Chad’, ’Congo’, ’Democratic Republic of
the Congo’, ’Equatorial Guinea’, ’Gabon’, ’Botswana’, ’Lesotho’, ’Namibia’,
’South Africa’, ’Swaziland’, ’Benin’, ’Burkina Faso’, ’Cape Verde’, ’C￿te
d’Ivoire’, ’Gambia’, ’Ghana’, ’Guinea’, ’Guinea-Bissau’, ’Liberia’, ’Mali’,
’Mauritania’, ’Niger’, ’Nigeria’, ’Senegal’, ’Sudan’, ’Sierra Leone’, ’Togo’.
9. "Slavic World" : ’Belarus’, ’Russian Federation’, ’Ukraine’, ’Repub-
lic of Moldova’,
10. "South Asian World" : ’India’, ’Afghanistan’, ’Bangladesh’, ’Bhutan’,
’Maldives’, ’Nepal’, ’Pakistan’, ’Sri Lanka’, ’Tajikistan’ , ’Indonesia’,
’Kazakhstan’, ’Malaysia’.
35Appendix 2: Description of the model
In this appendix, we provide a technical presentation of the economic part
of the INGENUE 2 model. A complete presentation of the model could be
found in Ingenue (2007a).
Households
Economic choices of households concern consumption/saving and are made
with perfect foresight at the beginning of their adult life. Labor supply is
assumed to be exogenously given by the age-speci￿c rate of participation to
the labor market, noted : ez
a. We take International Labor Organization
(ILO) data and projections to characterize activity from 1950 until 2015 and
we assume that after this date participation rates remain ￿xed at their 2015
level. Adults can (partially) retire from age rz and they may not stay in the
labor force after a legal maximal mandatory retirement age ¯ rz.
The intertemporal preferences of a new entrant in working life, native or
migrant, are given by the following life-time utility function over uncertain
streams of consumption cz
a and leaving a voluntary bequest Hz to their chil-




























T(t + T − a0)V (H
z(t + T − a0)) (2)
where ρ is the psychological discount factor, Ca is consumption at age a ; η
is the intertemporal substitution rate and V (·) is the instantaneous utility
of bequest : each agent has some felicity from leaving a bequest but it is
independent of the future stream of the consumption that his children draw
from this bequest (warm glow altruism).
At any given period, the budget constraint is :
14Usually in these kind of model the age T is the biological limit to life (here 105 years.)
but in order to imply a realistic pattern of inheritance among the children of deceased



































a(t) + (1 − θz(t))wz(t)ea(t)ϑa for a < ra
(1 − θz(t))wz(t)ea(t)ϑa + (1 − ea(t))P z
a(t) for ra ≤ a < ¯ ra
P z
a(t) for a ≥ ¯ ra
where Sz
a denotes the stock of assets held by the individual at the end of
age a and time t, Rz(t) · Sa(−1) is ￿nancial income (domestic real returns
on assets holdings times wealth). We assume Sa0−1 = 0 and S20 ≥ 0 for all
a ∈ [a0,...,20]. τa is the age-speci￿c equivalence scale that takes into account
costs of child-rearing (see details hereafter), and Ya is the non assets-based
net disposal income. τz
a(t)pz
f(t)Cz
a(t) denotes the total consumption (that is
the consumption of the parents and the one of their children). pz
f(t)Sz
a(t)
represents the wealth at the end of date t. pz
f(t) denotes the price of the
domestic ￿nal good (in terms of one foreign goods) so Rz(t) is one plus the
return to capital income expressed in units of this ￿nal good. Due to life
uncertainty at the individual level, we assume following Yaari (1965) that
there exists perfect annuities markets that pool death risk within the same
generation so that the return to capital is "corrected" by the instantaneous
survival probability of the generation. Besides children receive inherited as-
sets hz
a(t−1) from the voluntary bequests of their parents. People will leave
bequest Hz(t) to their heirs only at the age of T, so in Equation (3) ΥT(t)
is a dummy that will be equal to 1 if a = T and zero in any other case.
For full-time active years (a ∈ [a0,ra[), Ya is simply equal to the net labor
income after social security taxes (at rate θ), where w is the real wage rate per
e￿cient unit of labor at time t. When the agent is partly retired (a ∈ [ra, ¯ ra[),
she also receives a pension bene￿t P z
a for the unworked hours. And when she
is full-time retired (a ∈ [¯ ra,20]) she only receives the pension bene￿t. Unless
special mention, pension bene￿ts are assumed to be age independent.
The τz
a term is the age-speci￿c equivalence scale. It takes into account the
direct and indirect private costs of child-rearing. In order to calculate this
relative cost of child-rearing for each cohort, we use the age distribution of
children for each parent (from their past fertility behavior) and a constant
age equivalence scale of children.15. ζz
a(t) is the labor income that children
15Trying to get a more detailed structure would entail keeping the distribution of children
37bring to their parents resources during their childhood (calculated in the
same spirit as costs of children-rearing).
An agent’s earning ability is assumed to be an exogenous function of his
age. These skill di￿erences by age are captured by the e￿ciency parameter
ϑa which changes with age in a hump-shape way to re￿ect the evolution of
human capital. For simplicity, we assume that this age-e￿ciency pro￿le is
time-invariant and is the same in all regions. We adopt Miles (1999) human
capital pro￿le’s estimation and ϑa is normalized so that ϑa0 = 1.
Voluntary bequests are distributed to children according to the fertility cal-
endar of their deceased parents. At the equilibrium the sum of voluntary
bequest will be equal to the inheritance received by children. We assume
that bequests are distributed equally to all children, i.e. proportional to the
proportion of the children born from cohort of age T (according to her past
fertility calendar).
In our international context, households can choose the region they want









for all t > 0 (4)
where R?(t) is the unique world interest factor (in terms of the world numØraire),
the condition (4) means that if a region z’household saves one unit in his do-
mestic asset (capital) it will yield Rz(t) in real terms the next period, if he





The arbitrage condition then leads to return equalization.
The public sector
The pension P z
a(t) paid is a fraction κ(t) of the current average (net of tax)









In the baseline case, the regional age ra of minimum legal retirement age as
with respects to their grand-parents and would complicate in an useless way the number
of state variables in the system.
38well as the maximum age ¯ ra and the ratio κ(t) are ￿xed (at least after year
2000). Payroll tax rates θ(t) are thus endogenously determined by (5).
Production side
Intermediate good sector
Each zone z specializes in the production Y Iz of a single intermediate good.
Production in period t takes place with a constant return to scale Cobb-
Douglas production function using capital stock Kz(t − 1) installed at the








1−α 0 < α < 1 (6)

























I is the price of the domestic intermediate good, δz(t) is the rate of
economic depreciation and kz(t − 1) = Kz(t − 1)/Nz(t) is the capital-labor
ratio.
Final good production sector
The domestic composite ￿nal good of region z, Y F z, is produced according
to a combination of two intermediate goods: a "domestic" intermediate good
in quantities Bz and a "World" intermediate good in quantities Mz, accord-






















with ωz ∈ [0,1]. This CES combination of external and internal good to
produce domestic ￿nal good is a reminiscence of Armington (1969) aggre-
gator, AF z(t) being total factor productivity. Taking prices as given, the
39competitive behavior producer determines Bz and Mz that minimizes cur-
rent pro￿t: pz
f(t)Y F z(t)−pz
I(t)Bz(t)−p?(t)·Mz(t) subject to (9), where pz
I
is the price of the home-speci￿c intermediate good and p? is the price of the
world intermediate good.
The world producer of an homogenous world intermediate good
In order to simplify the exchanges of intermediate goods between regions of
the world, we assume that there exists a ￿ctive world producer that uses all
region-speci￿c intermediate goods in quantities X?,z in order to produce a

















This ￿ctive producer is assumed to act competitively, taking prices as given.




I(t) · Xz(t), subject to (10). This yields at the equilibrium








µ−1 for all z (11)
where for convenience Ez(t) =
pz
I(t)
p?(t) is de￿ned as the terms of trade. It can










A "trick" to model real imperfections on world ￿nancial market
For a world macroeconomic model to be realistic, the world asset capital
market has to be imperfect. Because sources of imperfection and asymmetries
in ￿nancial markets are various and uneasy to model with rigorous micro-
foundations in such a large scale model as Ingenue, we adopt the following
ad hoc formulation for δz the region-speci￿c rate of economic depreciation,
with ε > 0 :
δ
z(t) = ¯ δ









for all z (12)
40where Sz(t) =
P19
a=a0 La(t)Sa(t) is the aggregate ￿nancial wealth across all
cohorts in region z which is equal to the sum of the region capital stock and
the net assets on the rest of the world. This equation then indicates that
capital invested in a region z depreciates more rapidly than the average when
the region is a net debtor to the rest of the world.
41